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Market value and victorian hybrids: 
Dickens and Marx against latour
}
When Bruno Latour says that “we have never been modern,” 
he means only to recognize that the ‘actually living’ 
of modernity (or the temporal duration we’ve often categorized 
as ‘modernity’) is something altogether different (and far more 
complicated) than the theoretical apparatus by which 
academic intellectuals use to describe and categorize it. 
The modern condition, then, involves a separation between 
the socio-economic creation of ‘hybrid objects’ and theoretical 
reflection on society. This reflection takes the form of ‘puri-
fication,’ or a clear distinction between nature and culture, 
science and politics. Drawing upon Charles Dickens’ last 
completed novel, Our Mutual Friend, as well as Marx, I will 
argue that already in Victorian England we can find coherent 
representations of modernity that defy Latour’s high standard 
of actualized purification (or a visible ‘reality’ that conforms 
to our purified categorizations). That is, in Dickens and Marx 
we can find a literary-economic discourse of ‘modernity’ 
(which may also be Victorian post-humanism) that already 
recognized the failure of ‘purification’ as the result 
of expansive capitalism.
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When Bruno Latour says that “we have never been modern,” he means 
only to recognize that the ‘actually living’ of modernity (or the temporal 
duration we’ve often categorized as ‘modernity’) is something altogether 
different (and far more complicated) than the theoretical apparatus 
by which academic intellectuals use to describe and categorize it. 
He situates his extended project in the appropriately titled We Have Never 
Been Modern (1991) (and later in On the Modern Cult of the Factish Gods 
(2011)), which offers a treatment of the history of binaries that includes 
fact and fetish, arguing that modernity assumes a unique historical ability 
to sharply distinguish between them. The crisis of Western philosophy, 
Latour argues, stems from its inability to conceptualize the existence 
(or increased appearance) of ‘hybrids’ – entities that oscillate between 
the categories of politics and nature. The modern condition, then, involves 
a separation between the socio-economic creation of hybrids and theore-
tical reflection on society. This reflection takes the form of ‘purification,’ 
or a clear distinction between nature and culture, science and politics.
Latour points to 1989 as the watershed year for the collapse 
of the modern dream – it marks the end of “a state socialism that had 
the pretence to control both the social and the natural” (Noys 2010, 82). 
A large part of Latour’s critique of the modern is a critique of capitalism 
as an explanatory vehicle: a synecdoche of the modern philosophical 
project, capital is reified by Marxists via their positing of a super-object 
that subsumes all hybrids (including the very hybrids that ‘modern’ 
production produces so abundantly). In this essay, I will re-orient 
the reader’s focus not toward the ‘end’ of state socialism, but towards 
the beginning of the idea of communism, to the Victorian London of both 
Karl Marx and Charles Dickens. Drawing upon Dickens’ last completed 
novel, Our Mutual Friend, and Marx’s work, as well as a number 
of related commentaries within the contemporary discourse on Marxism 
and actor-network theory, I will argue that already in Victorian England 
we can find coherent representations of modernity that defy Latour’s high 
standard of actualized purification (or a visible ‘reality’ that conforms 
to our purified categorizations). That is, in Dickens and Marx we can find 
a literary-economic discourse of ‘modernity’ (which may also be Victorian 
post-humanism) that already recognizes the failure of ‘purification’ 
as the result of expansive capitalism.
Though in one sense they are only examples, Marx and Dickens 
nevertheless loom quite large in the historical discourse on modernity, 
not just as figures that provide well-known narrations but also as writers 
whose critical models (on the edges of political economy and novelistic 
narrative and structure) remain embedded in all corners of modern 
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intellectual life. By invoking Dickens alongside Marx in a critique 
of Latour’s specific brand of Actor-Network Theory, I hope to add a literary 
dimension (that is not merely ad hoc but tied historically and materially 
to Marx’s work at the point of its conception) to the multi-faceted 
debate on Marx, Latour, and the concept of totality. Drawing on some 
of the power of these thinkers’ formulations, I will attempt to show 
how Latour’s account of the failure of the modern project is a symptom 
of modern ideology par excellence, and that Latour’s vision “of a world 
in which ‘nothing is dispensable’ and therefore ‘nothing can be subtracted’ 
reproduces capital’s own fantasy of a world constantly available 
and amenable to abstraction and subsumption” (Noys 2010, 87), 
and thus stands in for the apotheosis of capitalist modernity as envisioned 
by both Marx and Dickens.
new Urban Markets
To the Latour who wrote We Have Never Been Modern, the contemporary 
crisis we face when we look the world and its representation in the news 
is not a crisis of capitalism but of the modern project. Threatening 
‘objects’ - like the hole in the ozone layer, the AIDS virus, or nuclear 
energy (all ‘hybrids’) – oscillate between the categories of the social 
and natural – one cannot exhaust the characteristics of these hybrids 
by appealing only to scientific/material or political/discursive explanations: 
“[Boyle’s air pump, Pasteur’s microbes, Archimedes’ pulleys] possess 
miraculous properties because they are at one and the same time both 
social and asocial, producers of natures and constructors of subjects” 
(Latour 1993, 112). From the perspective of the assemblage, thinkers 
as disparate as Wilson (for whom everything is nature), Bourdieu (for whom 
everything is culture and politics), and Derrida (for whom everything 
is language) all err equally: the matter of hybridity demonstrates that 
everything is everything, and that none of these hermeneutic boundaries 
are sustainable.
The modern constitution, reliant upon purified dichotomies 
and favored hermeneutics of reduction to various foundational bases, 
cannot conceptualize this combinational immanence despite the fact that 
modernity has produced (and continues to produce) more hybrids than 
any recorded historical period. As Latour writes: “The moderns have 
been victims of their own success,” since “the scope of the mobilization 
of collectives had ended up multiplying hybrids to such an extent that 
the constitutional framework which both denies and permits their 
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existence could no longer keep them in place” (Latour 1993, 49). Latour 
expresses his frustration that – since hybrid objects are not considered 
sacred to ‘moderns’ (as opposed to the efficacy of the fetish for ‘primitive’ 
societies) – we continue to rapidly and unthinkingly produce them, while 
repeatedly maintaining distinctions between the human and non-human, 
subject and object, nature and culture.
But Tamara Ketabgian, in her fascinating The Lives of Machines, 
which “explores the surprising industrial origins” of these ‘modern’ 
hybrids, promotes the re-reading and re-historicizing of Victorian culture 
“in ways that do not merely pit people against machines but that instead 
examine their close mingling and identification” (Ketabgian 2011, 1). 
Here I hope to follow Ketabgian by establishing a co-relation between 
Marx and Dickens. Whereas she “historicizes a mechanical model 
of affect that continues to inform a variety of theorists and philosophers 
today” (Ketabgian 2011, 3), ranging from the heirs of Freudian psycho-
analysis and their “vision of the human psyche as a dynamic hydraulic 
engine” to the post-humanism of Katherine Hayles and her reliance 
upon cybernetics and dynamical systems; my focus is centered specifically 
on Latour’s Victorian blind spot. In Chapter XV of Capital - “Machinery 
and Modern Industry” – the curious phenomenon of the ‘workman’ 
learning to “adapt his own movements to the uniform and unceasing 
motion of an automaton” was already quite thoroughly considered.
When the machinery, as a whole, forms a system of manifold machines, working 
simultaneously and in concert, the co-operation based upon it, requires the distri-
bution of various groups of workmen among the different kinds of machines…
Since the motion of the whole system does not proceed from the workman, 
but from the machinery, a change of persons can take place at any time without 
an interruption of the work (Tucker 1978, 408).
And Dickens’ last novel, concerned not with the factory but greater 
London, came quite close to seriously thinking hybridity and re-asserting 
(or at least reclaiming for literary analysis) the dominion of the sacred 
in the modern-capitalist proliferation of assemblages.
Our Mutual Friend, serialized in the years directly preceding the initial 
publication of Marx’s Capital, attempts to map the same London Marx 
himself was observing firsthand. A novel without a clear protagonist 
(the ‘friend’ of the title is John Rokesmith, the alter ego of John Harmon, 
presumed dead when ‘his’ body is fished out of the Thames at the outset 
of the novel), London is conceived of as a unified whole, a mapped tota-
lity, in which no individual subject-position is privileged. This is unusual 
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for a Victorian novel, sprawling as many of them are, since the common 
focus on either a marriage plot or an inheritance (both of which are also 
contained in Dickens’ novel) is challenged when the center of both 
is eliminated (Harmon forfeits, upon his ‘death,’ a vast inheritance 
and the hand of the lovely Bella Wilfer).
While the novel is populated by a number of Dickens’ trademark 
grotesques, a focus on monetary value (since, perhaps, it is money that 
is the only truly ‘mutual friend’ depicted in the novel) leads the reader 
into contemplation of an unhappy few. The narrative begins with Gaffer 
Hexam, a rogue who makes his living scouring wealth off the drowned 
bodies that turn up in the river, teaching his daughter Lizzie and his 
rival Riderhood a form of urban subsistence economics. Describing 
the polluted river as his daughter’s “meat and drink” (Dickens 1997, 
15), which is likely as literal as it is figurative, Gaffer proceeds to defend 
his occupation by lecturing on the impossibility of robbing a dead man: 
“What world does a dead man belong to? The other world. What world 
does money belong to? This world” (Dickens 1997, 16). Already a form 
of circulation that will be expanded into all corners of the city’s activity 
has been articulated: death and waste are converted into life, and river 
waste is converted into value.
The problem of recycling, in the conversion of waste into money, 
is but one small segment of the novel’s market assemblage. Live bodies 
are commodified just as thoroughly as dead ones, and markets for limbs 
and body parts as well as children and orphans proliferate (Dickens 
could be seen here as anticipating, albeit in a less global sense, what 
Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell have called “tissue economies”). 
Silas Wegg is a peg-legged guttersnipe whose amputated leg, which he 
hopes to get back, is initially in the possession of Mr. Venus, a taxidermist 
and articulator of bones whose shop is filled with animal and human 
body parts to be bought and sold. One easily sees, in the bumbling 
activities and desires of Wegg, an extension of Herbert Sussman 
and Gerhard Joseph’s thesis on the posthuman in Dickens’s novels (parti-
cularly Dombey and Son), which “[negotiate] the machine/body issues 
of his age by representing in fantastical terms the splice of the machine 
and the organic” (Sussman and Joseph 2004, 617). They look particularly 
at Dickens’s concern with prosthesis, “the dismemberment and articu-
lation of body parts” (Sussman and Joseph 2004, 618), though they 
mention Wegg and Venus only briefly. Wegg’s leg operates as the key 
fulcrum of a massive assemblage in the novel, of the legal doctrines 
of property, the ethical definitions of life and body, the circulation 
of parcels, and the action of the market, all of which fall under Wegg’s 
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metaphor of the blood ‘flow’ which he hopes to resuscitate in the limb. 
Here too, instead of “accepting a Ruskinian opposition of the mechanical 
and the organic,” which is a dimension of the modern error according 
to Latour, Dickens “absorbed the reconstruction of the human 
in the machine age” by foreshadowing “the limits, the boundaries, 
and the fusion of the human and the mechanical” (Sussman and Joseph 
2004, 626).
Forms of speculation and circulation extend thus from the most 
concrete and material (excrement and body parts) to the least material, 
which is represented in the financial ‘shares’ of fraudulent high society 
types like the Veneerings and the Lammles:
As is well known to the wise in their generation, traffic in Shares is the one 
thing to have to do with in this world. Have no antecedents, no established 
character, no cultivation, no ideas, no manners; have Shares. Have Shares enough 
to be on Boards of Direction in capital letters, oscillate on mysterious business 
between London and Paris, and be great. Where does he come from? Shares. 
Where is he going to? Shares. What are his tastes? Shares. Has he any principles? 
Shares. What squeezes him into Parliament? Shares. Perhaps he never of himself 
achieved success in anything, never originated anything, never produced 
anything? Sufficient answer to all; Shares (Dickens 1997, 118).
But while some of the novel’s most detestable creatures engage in the wild 
fantasy of the stock market, the logic of speculation is universalized 
across the city’s many characters and classes. John Harmon’s father 
speculated on the future of Bella when, having merely glimpsed her 
as a child, he wrote her future into his will (as the eventual husband 
of his son). The Lammles are two people who fake fortunes in order 
to trade up in the spousal futures market. The Boffins, the couple that 
inherit Harmon’s fortune once he’s pronounced dead, seek to adopt 
a child in the aforementioned orphan market that’s eerily similar 
in description to the financial markets:
The suddenness of an orphan’s rise in the market was not to be paralleled 
by the maddest records of the Stock Exchange. He would be at five thousand 
per cent discount out at nurse making a mud pie at nine in the morning, 
and (being inquired for) would go up to five thousand per cent premium before 
noon. The market was “rigged” in various artful ways (Dickens 1997, 195).
Mary Poovey, in her analysis of “speculation and virtue” in the novel, 
reads passages like this as a humorous critique of “the infiltration 
of economic motives into the domestic sphere” (Poovey 1995, 165). 
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More substantively, according to Poovey, the structure of the Harmon 
plot serves to “re-write ‘value,’” to affect an inversion of speculation 
and commodification at the level of content that nonetheless maintains 
its form. To understand how this works, and to relate this literary move 
to the viability of thinking about ‘modernity,’ one must read the Marx 
(and the deviation from Marx) in Dickens.
new Economic Transformations
Poovey’s reading of the novel, which examines its romantic relationships 
closely, formalizes the problem of money and value: “Taking money lite-
rally, as a good and an end in itself, leads to the literal commodification 
of human beings” while “recognizing the metaphorical nature of money 
facilitates exchanges that enhance domestic relations and bring out 
the humanity in people” (Poovey 1995, 166). Poovey is thus latching 
onto the ambiguous relation between the novel’s logic and Marx’s logic 
of reification: here, under capital, relations between people become 
relations between things (most obviously in the character of Wegg, 
but also in Headstone’s vision of Lizzie, for instance), but there is also 
a fantasy of capitalism ‘with a human face’ operating. A moralized 
version of Gaffer’s subsistence economics, the transformation of Bella 
is a conversion of material wealth into metaphoric wealth and human 
value – this is the engine behind her ‘benefactor’ Boffin’s ploy to demonstrate 
the wickedness of the miser. The ‘magic’ of the commodity fetishism we 
find in Marx, where the disguised nature of production under capital 
and the shift from the dominance of use-value to exchange-value leads 
to the attribution of ‘magical’ properties to marketed things, is inverted 
for moral and ethical use: Mrs. Boffin, looking upon Bella and thinking 
of the inheritance, observes that it was “as if [Harmon’s] money 
had turned bright again, after a long long rust in the dark, and was 
at last a beginning to sparkle in the sunlight” (Dickens 1997, 757). 
Here the newly domesticated woman is the end result of the process 
of the re-humanization of wealth; the plot allows Bella the objects 
of her original desire (money and things) only when she no longer desires 
them as such.1
1   One of the roadblocks to a wider reading of Dickens avec Marx comes 
in the consideration of a feminist Marxist analysis of Our Mutual Friend, which I do 
not aim to provide here. The role of Bella Wilfer in the novel, for instance, conforms 
quite easily to standard 19th-century narratives of domesticity and middle class, 
self-sacrificial femininity.
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Dickens and Marx, writing from the same the place at virtually 
the same time, thus provide somewhat competing accounts of the ‘modern.’ 
Although of course Dickens does not speak Marx’s technical language 
(nowhere do we find terms like ‘socially necessary labor,’ ‘constant 
and variable capital,’ or the ‘industrial reserve army’), he indeed presents 
a number of capital’s most notable symptoms: we see London households 
as sites of consumption that mask class relations of labor and production 
(the Veneering’s new abode), the displacement of desire into inanimate 
objects (Wegg’s leg and Boffin’s books), and a picture of profit that 
nonetheless recognizes the zero labor value of the capitalist (the incorri-
gible usurer Fledgeby). Dickens and Marx literally begin from the same 
place, empirically if not theoretically, but differ in their politics: while 
Marx’s answer to the largely new system of production, commodification, 
and class structure is struggle and the counter-production of proletarian 
class-consciousness, Dickens’s proletariat are all lumpenproletariat, rogues 
without even the potential for class-consciousness (Riderhood’s near 
death experience pointedly demonstrates his incapacity for substantial 
change). Dickens’s grotesques are static, perhaps due to their lack 
of access to the middle class. And so moral progress in the novel, demon-
strated by Bella as well as Eugene Wrayburn (initially a drifting lawyer 
without a clear relation to society), relies upon both rejecting conspicuous 
consumption and financial capital and accepting some form of domestic 
middle class existence.
But what, then, is the relation between these Victorian alternatives 
and modernity proper or, according to Latour, its impossibility? Latour’s 
distinction between systems and networks is significant here: “More 
supple than the notion of system, more historical than the notion 
of structure, more empirical than the notion of complexity, the idea 
of network is the Ariadne’s thread of [the] interwoven stories” (Latour 
1993, 3) told by interdisciplinary actors that cross the boundaries 
of nature and culture. The key is the focus on the ‘thread’ itself rather 
than the substance of the connections between objects – translation, 
the network theorist’s alternative to purification, occurs when one traces 
the production of hybrids while bracketing the question of their rootedness 
in the natural, political, or social. Systems, on the other hand, presuppose 
foundations, and assume some objects or forces to be more real, complex, 
or even simply more interesting than all others – a Marxian analysis 
of base-superstructure relations, indeed, posits economic forces 
as ontologically and causally primary to social products. For Latour, 
this involves the influx of idealism into materialism, and betrays the flat, 
concrete, and immanent ontology of networks.
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Johan Söderberg and Adam Netzen relate this brand of Actor-
Network critique of political economy to a form of Open Marxism that 
shares with the former a post-structuralist (and particularly Deleuzian) 
orientation toward Hegelian dialectics (referencing Latour’s “summary 
dismissals of the dialectical method” - Söderberg and Netzen 2010, 
104)). In both cases one finds a dissatisfaction with base-superstructure 
analysis on ontological grounds, and the influence of Mario Tronti 
and Harry Cleaver’s claims that “[there] are certainly regularities, 
or ‘laws,’ of commodity exchange just as there is a logic to the commodity- 
-form itself, but that logic and those laws are only those which capital 
succeeds in imposing” (Cleaver 2000, 77, also quoted in Söderberg 
and Netzen 2010, 99). Latour and Open Marxists join hands in rejecting 
the structural reifications of orthodox Marxist dialectics, rendering 
supposed “social facts” like “(class) interest, power (structure), and references 
to capital/capitalism” as radically contingent (Söderberg and Netzen 2010, 109).
Hence on the one hand we have, with Marx himself, a systemic 
meta-narrative that sublates the locality of forms of production, whether 
material or cultural, in a universalizing logic, while on the other hand 
the very purpose of his analysis is to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of the picture of ‘immateriality’ (the commodity fetish) produced 
by capital, in which “the existence of the things qua commodities, 
and the value-relation between the products of labour which stamps 
them as commodities, [has] absolutely no connection with their physical 
properties and with the material relations arising therefrom” (Tucker 
1978, 321). Further, while Marx’s account of exchange and circulation 
in the Grundrisse maps a totality (for that is essentially the definition 
of the latter term in relation to the former), it is one that seems to differ 
from Latour’s material networks only in the acknowledged reality of a few 
key ideological points: “[the] conclusion we reach is not that production, 
distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they 
all form members of a totality, distinctions within a unity,” so that 
production predominates over all other mutually-interacting ‘moments’ 
of the process of capital accumulation only because, for historical 
and empirically verifiable reasons, “distribution [is] distribution of products” 
(Tucker 1978, 236; my italics).
If capital according to Marx is too large and all-consuming for Latour, 
it is for Marx too; the difference, it appears, is that Marx believes 
in the ideological efficacy of capital’s real (concrete) abstractions. That is, 
the abstractions produced under capital are part of the real for Marx, but 
not for Latour, which makes Latour’s claim for a flat, planar ontology 
problematic. According to Noys, Latour “neglects the function of real 
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abstraction and real subsumption in shaping forms of agency.” Accepting 
the existence of something called capital does not necessarily imply material 
determination of all else by it, but rather the acknowledgement that 
powerful abstractions dictate “the need to struggle on [its] terrain if one 
should want to overturn it” (Noys 2010, 86). And Söderberg and Netzen, 
by drawing the link between Latour and a form of Marxism that rejects 
capital-centric historical narratives like Fordism and post-Fordism, or any 
“Marxist accounts which seek to identify distinct periods in capitalism” 
(Söderberg and Netzen 2010, 112), show that Latour thereby deprives 
himself of the tools to articulate anything but a sweeping, reductive 
account of modernity.2
It should come as no surprise, then, that Latour also misunder-
stands the historically situated role of Marx’s fetish, as Hylton White 
argues. Situating his work within a more general sphere of post-critical 
theory (along with ‘critics’ like Rita Felski), White claims that Latour’s 
interpretation of the Marxian fetish associates the concept itself with 
“the suspicious methodology that seeks to look behind things rather 
than at them, in an alleged privileging of depth over surface” (White 
2013, 668). On this account, “to call a thing a ‘fetish’ is to show no 
care for the technical complexities of its creation or the sheer fragility 
of its existence” (White 2013, 669). But Marx does not “conceptualize 
the fetishism of commodities as a consequence of the (false) beliefs that 
people hold about things.” Rather, fetishism inheres “in the social effects 
of the way the commodity form is organized, qua form, as a template 
for assembling connections between a host of objects, actors, and activities.” 
Dickens recognizes those “social effects” in his representation of the concrete 
movement of objects and bodies through London, and his novel is truly 
materialist in its “historically grounded account of the work of the form 
[of the commodity] in associating activities” (White 2013, 680). Like 
Marx, Dickens is well aware that the problem of the commodity fetish 
is the resulting epistemological dematerialization of “the material condi-
tions for a flourishing of intersubjectivity” (White 2013, 678).
2   Another way to put this, of course, is that Latour deprives himself of the tools 
to articulate anything but an overly reductive account of capital and capital accu-
mulation (so that all attempts at a total Marxian critique merely replicate the false 
dichotomies at the heart of the ‘modern project’). A demonstration of the way 
Marx and Dickens actually already were in the process of theorizing and represen-
ting the compatibility of the commodity fetish with proto-network models runs 
parallel to Noel Castree’s and Steven Shaviro’s attempts (to name but two exam-
ples in contemporary thought) at dissolving the antagonism between Marxism 
and actor-network theory by correcting a few vital misunderstandings of Marx 
on the part of certain partisans of the latter movement.
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Ultimately, Latour’s Marxist straw man fails to acknowledge 
that capitalism, while a totality, is a totality that possesses contradictions, 
and that those contradictions bear witness to its failure at purification. 
Both Marx himself and Dickens in Our Mutual Friend outline some 
of these contradictions and demonstrate (implicitly) the intellectual danger 
of a position like Latour’s, whose “claims to remove an abstract capitalism 
and replace it with a world of rich concrete actualities” actually “reproduces 
the vision of an entirely seamless capitalism that he claims to contest” 
(Noys 2010, 88), since he allows no conception of capital’s immanent 
negativity or structural limit. Marx, however, does: there are (eventually) 
unavoidable impasses, crises of realization where production outstrips 
consumption, necessary since workers are themselves consumers whose wage 
value is less than value produced and, as argued in the Grundrisse, as a result 
of the relation between technology and productive expansion:
[To] the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real wealth comes 
to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than 
on the power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose “powerful 
effectiveness” is itself in turn out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent 
on their production… Labour no longer appears so much to be included within 
the production; rather, the human being comes to relate more as watchman 
and regulator to the production process itself (Tucker 1978, 284).
In this depiction, capital, in its expansion, hits walls that it must deal 
with, postponing systemic collapse but always moving on with creakier 
foundations. One might call this Marx’s condition of modernity, 
and it isn’t one of illusory purification but rather messy complexification 
in its constant production of crises.3
3   Though not exactly central to the argument here, Noel Castree’s take 
on capital’s effect on the nature/society relation provides another important facet 
of the dissolution of the real distinction between Marxism and actor-network theory. 
From an ecological perspective, which Our Mutual Friend certainly provides in its 
representation of the Thames, Castree claims that “[by] splitting the difference between 
a certain kind of ANT and a certain kind of green Marxism, one can perhaps derive 
some of the conceptual tools necessary to make supple sense of the processes driving 
nature’s accelerated creative destruction in the twenty first century” (Castree 2002, 
142). This insight is consistant with the acknowledgement of capital accumulation 
as a process of “complexification” rather than “illusory purification,” a recognition that 
“natural entities are [not] mere putty in the hands of capital” but “necessary and active 
moments in a continuous process of circulation and accumulation,” where “the material 
effects that ‘natural’ entities have upon capital accumulation are variable and contin-
gent, but rarely passive” (Castree 2002, 139).
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In contrast, by claiming to be more concrete than Marx, and by 
attempting to deflate capitalism “from an unchangeable monstrous 
world-dominant regime to a micro-generated network amenable 
to change,” Latour actually forfeits “any meaningful politics” in favor 
of a “questionable metaphysics”:
[Real] abstractions are precisely what undermine the usual ontological distinction 
between the concrete and the abstract. Real abstraction indicates that capital 
constitutes itself as a totality, or, in Hegel-ese, posits its own presuppositions. This 
‘totality’ operates through the distribution of positive differences and the void 
of capitalism itself – its own lack of content. Latour’s conception of a world 
of concrete differences and his voiding of the category of capitalism merely 
reproduces this ontology of real abstraction at one remove (Noys 2010, 85).
This is the way in which Latour’s critique, despite itself, actually gives 
(intellectual) body to the process of capitalist modernity. His misun-
derstanding of the commodity form and fetish repeats Marx’s own 
observation in ‘Crisis Theory’ (from Theories of Surplus Value) that 
the irreconcilable nature of capital’s crises is “reasoned out of existence 
here by forgetting or denying the first elements of capitalist production: 
the existence of the product as a commodity” (Tucker 1978, 445). 
Beyond merely observing that Latour, like certain post-structuralists, 
misrecognizes the kind of leftist critique appropriate for post-Fordist 
(or postmodern) capital, one should take a step further: his particular 
commitment to ‘purification’ as the modern impulse and his intuition 
that, like modernity itself, “if capitalism doesn’t reach its own standard 
it simply doesn’t exist,” not only leads him to miss “the way in which 
capitalism certainly does constantly make and re-make itself ” through 
real, concrete abstractions but, in doing so, “leaves us all the more vulnerable 
to capitalism” (Noys 2010, 87).
When Alberto Toscano draws attention to the project of 20th century 
aesthetic panoramas (in particular, the work of Allan Sekula and Mark 
Lombardi), which attempt to “see [society] whole” despite (and thus 
including) the persistence of contradiction, he does so in order to 
critique Latour’s assumption that “the theoretical desire for totality” 
is “incompatible with a painstaking attention to traces, objects 
and devices” (Toscano 2012, 70). To my mind, Toscano’s categorization 
of a form of art-theory that attempts to totalize through “the exploration 
of the truncated, instrumental or illusory representations of the whole” 
(Toscano 2012, 80) hits, albeit anachronistically, upon the value of 
Our Mutual Friend. Dickens, writing at the dawn of urban-industrial 
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capital rather than at its (supposed) end, observed with striking clarity 
the network aspects of a rising modernity that couldn’t be explained 
without a concrete analysis of money, commodification, and material 
circulation. It is in the ways Our Mutual Friend draws conclusions different 
than Marx’s, in its glorification of domesticity as a haven within capital, 
that Dickens sets in motion a leftist meta-dialectic (a literary, philoso-
phical, and theoretical conversation about capital and praxis) that is 
neither purified nor all-consuming but a very real process of the struggle 
to think (and thus map) modernity. The very problem of modernity here, 
a century before Latour’s statement that ‘a modern’ actor-network theory 
is one of materiality, of the difference between the immateriality of financial 
speculation and commodification and wealth that nonetheless ‘flows’ 
through a series of material manifestations (and not stopped up either 
by the holdings of misers generally antithetical to the project of moral 
progress).4 Along with Marx, Dickens recognized both the production 
of ideological abstractions by capital (which includes the illusion that 
capital has no outside and no alternative) and the antagonisms, ready 
to be mapped and approximated by the thinkers and artists of the social 
network, which might tear the monstrous system apart.
4   A more metaphysical approach to Dickens might productively utilize 
the ‘new materialism’ and object-oriented ontologies as a way of grappling with 
the relation between the material and immaterial beyond their transformations 
within the commodity form.
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